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Over the several decades, rent-burdens for low-and moderate-income New Yorkers have 
continued to increase, leading to demands for more affordable housing. This trend has become 
only worse with citywide gentrification over time. Federal, state and city governments have 
implemented various subsidized housing programs to support more affordable housing units. 
One of the key determinants in stocks of affordable units is the opt-out rate, which is dependent 
on property owners’ decision to leave the program after the contract term. Thus, information on 
what factors make owners stay in or leave subsidy programs can be useful in policy-makers’ 
effort to preserve affordable housing units. This study examines factors associated with 
gentrification and their relationship with opt-out rate of subsidized rental housing programs. 
Through a statistical logistic regression model, this study investigated if factors associated with 
gentrification, such as median income, nearby property prices and other neighborhood 
conditions, have bigger impacts on owner’ decisions to stay or leave subsidy programs than other 
factors that generally affect property prices or owner’s decision to change property prices. The 
results suggested that gentrification predictors have substantial impacts on property’s opting-out, 
comparable to other control factors. The findings of this study highlights the importance of using 
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Over the past decades, New York City has witnessed increasing rent-burdens for low-and 
moderate income renters, and a need for more affordable housing has grown accordingly. 
Several federal and state subsidized housing programs, such as U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) financing and insurance programs, HUD project-based rental 
assistance, the New York City and New York State Mitchell-Lama Programs, or Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), have been implemented to create and preserve affordable rental 
units. Under these programs, private property owners keep rents affordable for the duration of 
the subsidy term, and upon the expiration of the contracts, they may leave the program.  This 
indicates that the change in the stock of affordable housing units can be heavily dependent on 
owners’ opt-out rates, not just on new development.   
 
Thus, for policy-makers who strive to preserve affordable housing units, it is important to 
identify what factors make owners stay in or leave subsidy programs. These factors can vary 
from individual property’s characteristics to neighborhood conditions where the subsidized 
housing units are located. However, despite the importance, there have not been sufficient 
studies conducted on these factors. In this sense, this study can shed some lights on this 
important subject, with a special focus on neighborhood conditions. The findings of this study 
can be useful in devising incentives for owners to stay in, or even newly opt in subsidized 










2.1. Affordable Housing Challenge in New York City  
For decades, low and moderate income New Yorkers have struggled to find affordable housing 
in the City’s expensive housing market, and this challenge has only worsened over time.   
As Table 1 indicates, adjusted to 2010 dollars, while the city’s median household income showed 
a modest increase from $49,693 to $50,886 between 1970 and 2010, the median rent has almost 
doubled from $555 to $1,004. In other words, the city’s median household income has remained 
stagnant, whereas the median rent has been rising considerably faster between 1970 and 2010.  
 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Total Occupied 
Housing Units 
2,836,872 2,788,530 2,819,401 3,021,588 3,109,784 
Renter Occupied 
Units  
76.4% 76.6% 71.4% 69.8% 69.0% 
Median Household 
Income (2010$) 
$49,693 $40,645 $51,865 $50,539 $50,886 
Median Rent (2010$) $555 $628 $779 $853 $1,004 
Rent-burdened 
households  
28.5% 38.6% 39.0% 40.7% 48.7% 
Severely Rent 
Burdened households  
- 20.1% - 22.3% 26.3% 
 
Table 1. Housing in New York City 
Source: NYU Furman Center, original data retrieved from U.S. Census, American Community Survey, New York 
City Housing and Vacancy Survey. 
 
As a consequence of these trends, a significant number of New Yorkers have been faced with 
increasing rent burdens. One of the commonly accepted definitions of a “rent-burdened” 
household is one that pays more than 30 percent of its income on rent. A “severely rent-burdened 
household” would be paying more than half of its income on rent (NYC Department of City 
  




Planning & NYC Department of Housing Preservation & Development, 2015). By this 
definition, the number of rent-burdened households in New York City has risen sharply over 
decades, to almost 50 percent of all renter households, and the share of severely rent burdened 
households amounted to 26 percent, as illustrated in Table 1.  
Although this rising rent burden is a general trend for all renter households, an analysis of rent 
burden by income band indicates that lower income households tend to face higher rent burdens.  
As Figure 1 shows, households at low income bracket or below1 pay more than 30 percent of 
their incomes toward rents, experiencing serious rent-burdens, while moderate and middle 
income households pay less share of their incomes to rents.  
 
 
Figure 1. Median Gross Rent to Income Ratio by HUD Income Limits, New York City 2011 
Source: 2011 NYC Housing and Vacancy Survey, Mandatory Inclusionary Housing, NYC Department of City 
Planning, NYC Department of Housing Preservation & Development. (2015). 
 
 
                                                            
1 HUD defines income limits as follows. Based on Area Median Income (AMI) for a given geographic area, 
generally a Metropolitan Statistical Area, households who earn less than 30 percent of the AMI are considered to be 
extremely low-income, between 30 percent and 50 percent of AMI to be very low-income, between 50 percent and 
80 percent of AMI to be low-income, and between 80 percent and 120 percent of AMI to be moderate-income.  
  




2.2. Subsidized Housing Programs  
2.2.1 Overview of Subsidy Programs 
To reduce the burden on a number of rental households in New York City, the city, state and 
federal governments have come up with various affordable housing programs that preserve and 
provide affordable housing stocks. Besides public housing apartments that are owned and 
operated by the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), a large share of affordable 
housing units have been provided through subsidy programs. Under these initiatives, private 
developers build and keep housing stocks affordable to low and moderate income households in 
exchange for subsidies for a set time period. Major subsidy programs through which a large 
share of affordable housing units were provided include HUD financing and insurance programs, 
HUD project-based rental assistance, Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), and Mitchell-
Lama program.  
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
HUD financing and insurance 3,079 11,361 14,898 995 173 
HUD financing and insurance/project-based rental 
assistance 
467 7,494 22,797 5,326 2,915 
Project-based rental assistance 891 4,889 11,803 2,164 1,390 
Project-based rental assistance/Mitchell-Lama 0 22,996 248 0 0 
Mitchell-Lama 14,772 19,199 0 0 0 
Mitchell-Lama/HUD financing and insurance 0 1,788 0 0 0 
HUD financing and insurance/project-based rental 
assistance/Mitchel-Lama 
0 9,029 0 0 0 
LIHTC 0 0 2,928 29,697 38,383 
LIHTC/HUD financing and insurance 0 0 327 1,358 0 
LIHTC/project-based rental assistance 0 0 0 103 0 
LIHTC/HUD financing and insurance/project-based 
rental assistance 
0 0 0 0 802 
 
Table 2. Number of Units Developed by Decade and Program Subsidy Category 
 Source: Reina & Williams (2012). 
  




HUD Financing and Insurance 
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) of the US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) have financing and insurance programs that provide mortgage subsidies to 
private owners of multifamily housing to reduce development costs. In return, HUD required 
owners to agree to low income ‘use restrictions’ which restricted occupancy to households that 
meet the programs’ income limits and restricted contract renters. A total of 630 properties with 
86,600 units of affordable housing were developed through these programs (NYU Furman 
Center, 2011).  
 
HUD Project-based Rental Assistance 
HUD has also provided a direct rental subsidy to owners through project-based rental assistance. 
Under these programs, tenants pay a certain percentage of the household’s income in monthly 
rent, no greater than 30 percent of his or her income, and HUD pays the difference between the 
tenant’s payment and the HUD-approved contract rent to the owner. The program facilitated the 
development of 697 properties with 104,000 units in New York City.  
 
Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program  
Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program (LIHTC) was created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
to encourage private individuals and corporations to invest in affordable housing for lower 
income households. This program provides a tax credit over a 10-year period-a dollar-for dollar 
reduction in federal taxes owned on other income. By the end of 2010, 80,400 units had been 








Mitchell-Lama was a moderate to middle-income housing development program operated by 
New York State from 1955 to 1978. In exchange for low interest mortgage loans and real 
property tax exemptions, developers agreed to regulation regarding rents charged and tenant 
selection. A total of 174 rental properties with 69,800 units were built under this program 
between 1955 and 1978.   
 
2.2.2. Opt-Out of Subsidy Programs  
 
 
Figure 2. Subsidized Units No Longer Subject to Affordability Restrictions, by Exit Year 
Source: State of New York City’s Subsidized Housing: 2011. NYU Furman Center (2011) 
 
Through one or multiple combination of these major programs, around 235,000 units of 
affordable rental housing were financed since the 1960s in New York City. Although these 
programs are managed by different government agencies and vary in contract periods, tenant 
eligibility, rent limit and other subsidy conditions, they are all privately owned, publicly 
subsidized program that are not permanently affordable with respective expiration dates. Upon 
the end of their subsidy term, a property owner can choose to stay in the programs, by renewing 
the contract and extending the affordability restrictions of the units. An owner also may leave the 
  




program by opting out of all affordability restrictions and converting property to market-rate 
rental or condominium, and by selling his or her property to a new owner. Indeed, as Figure 2 
shows, a number of properties have left subsidy programs after their expirations, leaving nearly 
one-quarter of the 235,000 units described above opted out as of 2010. This can be translated that 
a change in total affordable housing stocks can be dependent not only on new development but 
also on opt-out rates (NYU Furman Center, 2015).  
Despite its importance in affordable housing policy, there have not been many studies done on 
these possible factors related to the opt-out decision, mainly due to lack of owner information. 
Several recent studies on this subject, however, indicate some common characteristics among 
properties that have left the subsidized housing programs.  
 
2.2.3. Factors Associated with Opt-out  
In ‘Multifamily Properties: Opting in opting out and remaining affordable’, prepared for the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (Econometrica and Abt Associates, 2006), 
HUD-assisted project-based multifamily stocks were closely examined. The study compared 
properties that have left the assisted stock with that have remained in the HUD programs through 
quantitative descriptive analysis and qualitative descriptions of case studies. A multivariate 
logistic regression was conducted to explain the owners’ opt-out/opt-in decisions based on 
property, owner, program, and location variables. The study revealed that family-occupied 
properties in relatively well-off neighborhoods with market rents greater than the rents charged 
in the assisted properties have a higher likelihood of leaving the HUD-assisted stock.  
A follow-up research, “Opting in, Opting out: a decade later” (HUD Multi-disciplinary Research 
Team, 2015), updated the 2006 analysis by replicating the quantitative analysis with additional 
  




variables of regional and local housing market characteristics. In this research, the authors 
assessed the status of over 18,000 properties in HUD’s multifamily portfolio from 2005 to 2014. 
Their analysis results echoed many of the findings in the original study, but property 
characteristics explain less of the variation in owners’ decisions. Opt-outs continued to be more 
likely among properties that had low rent-to-Fair Market Rent ratios, were owned by for-profits, 
and were designated for family occupancy. The rent-to-FMR and ownership type variables were 
much less influential in this latest analysis than in the original report. Other factors associated 
with increased risk of opt-outs included partial rather than full coverage of units in the 
development by rental assistance contracts; lower physical inspection scores, implying that 
owners may opt out of Section 8 contracts when properties have extensive repair needs or are at 
risk of contract abatement by HUD; strong neighborhood rental housing markets; and strong 
regional home sales markets. 
 
Reina and Begley (2014), focusing on Mitchell-Lama properties in New York City, conducted 
another quantitative research and yielded consistent results. In other words, properties located in 
neighbors with high property value growth, those with for-profit owners, and those past the 
affordability restrictions on all subsidies are more likely to opt out.  
 
2.2.4. Neighborhood Condition Factors  
As such, not only the individual characteristics of program, property, tenant and its owner, but 
also certain neighborhood conditions in which subsidized properties are located have an impact 
on opt-out decision. It is reasonable to assume that neighborhood conditions matter given that 
properties in subsidy programs are privately owned, and their owners are likely to view their 
  




properties as investment and want to maximize their return. Consider a case where market-rate 
rentals in the neighborhood increased considerably since a property’s opt-in of a subsidy 
program. If the owner of the property views the mandated rent level in exchange for subsidy is 
too low compared to the increased neighborhood rent level, he or she may leave the subsidy 
program upon the expiration and convert the property into market-rate rentals to realize higher 
potential profits (Reina and Begley, 2014). Forces that drive such neighborhood rent appreciation 
and a larger housing market change can be demographic changes in the neighborhood as well as 
the overall macroeconomic trend. One of the remarkable demographic changes that New York 
City and other U.S. cities have experienced during the past several decades is gentrification.  
 
2.3. Gentrification in New York City  
Gentrification is a complex process that has been widely debated in many literature. Freeman 
and Braconi (2004) described gentrification as a “dramatic shift in their demographic 
composition toward better education and more affluent residents”. Similarly, Vigdor et al. (2011) 
viewed that “gentrification brings renewed population growth, accompanied by an inflow of 
households with high education attainment, professional jobs, and few children. Corresponding 
outflows of socioeconomic status households are tempered to the extent that the neighborhood 
begins the process with high vacancy rates or the potential for more intensive development. 
Finally, gentrification often implies racial transition.” Whereas authors like Nelson (1988) 
imposes an additional necessary condition that initial residents must be displaced in the process, 
Kennedy and Leonard (2001) argued that gentrification must change “the essential character and 
flavor of the neighborhood”.   
 
  




As the definition and nature of gentrification vary, so does its implication. One of the most 
frequently noted impacts of gentrification is displacement of lower-income households resulting 
from redevelopment projects or rising rents (Freeman and Braconi, 2004). LeGates and Hartman 
(1986) also argued that gentrification will force low-income minority groups out of desirable 
inner-city neighborhoods to less desirable areas, thus reducing their quality of life and diffusing 
and defusing their political power. Similarly, Newman (2006) pointed out the negative impacts 
of gentrification as not only the immediate displacement of residents in the process, but also as 
the impact of the restructuring of urban space on the ability of low-income residents to move into 
neighborhoods that once provided ample supplies of affordable living arrangements. As such, 
although previous studies on a link between gentrification and displacement have produced 
mixed results, it seems clear that gentrification is an important factor that affect rental and 
housing market trends in general.  
 
In the meantime, it is well known that New York City has experienced drastic gentrification 
since the 1990s, as suggested by ample previous studies. Specifically, Freeman and Braconi 
(2004), in their analysis on gentrification and displacement, discussed that New York City’s size 
and rapid regional economic growth during the 1990s produced several distinct areas of 
gentrification, as illustrated in Figure 3. Over time, this gentrification trend has only widened and 
intensified.  
  





Figure 3. Location of Subsidized Property and Gentrification in New York City 
Source: NYC Department of City Planning, NYU Furman Center 
Note: Gentrifying neighborhoods identified by Freeman and Braconi (2004) include Chelsea, Harlem, the Lower 









A focus on gentrification in relation to opt-out is relevant considering the location of subsidized 
housing. As the Figure 3 shows, subsidized housing units are widely distributed in every 
borough, and substantial number of them were located in identified gentrifying areas. This 
suggests possible impacts of gentrification on subsidized properties. It is also worth noting that 
many neighborhoods where subsidized housing units are located are susceptible to gentrification. 
According to NYU Furman Center’s report (2015), subsidized housing has generally been built 
in neighborhoods with low land costs, but in the intervening years, market rents and prices in 
some of these neighborhoods have risen considerably (NYU Furman Center, 2011), making 
opting out and converting to market-rate an attractive choice for a profit-seeking owner.  
Taken together, it would be useful and significant to investigate whether neighborhood 


















3. Data and methods 
3.1. Data Collection 
Data for this thesis is mainly drawn from NYU Furman Center’s Subsidized Housing 
Information Project (SHIP) and US Census. SHIP contains physical and financial information on 
about 235,000 units of privately-owned subsidized affordable rental properties in New York City 
developed with financing and insurance from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), HUD project-based rental assistance, New York City or State Mitchell-
Lama financing, or the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). SHIP database also provides 
information on the status of each subsidized program which allows users to infer owners’ opt-out 
decision. Information about neighborhood conditions where subsidized housing units were 
located is collected by census tract level. It is mainly retrieved from 1990 Census, 2012 
American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates. Other data sources include United States 




This research aims to examine whether there is a relationship between gentrification and owners’ 
opt-out decision from subsidized rental housing programs. The hypothesis is that properties 
located in gentrifying areas are more likely to opt out subsidized housing programs than in those 
in not gentrifying areas. To prove this hypothesis, privately-owned rental units that started any of 
the major subsidized housing programs  since 19902 are analyzed. To distinguish the effect of  
                                                            
2 Despite data availability for Mitchell-Lama program in SHIP database, as this study only covers properties that 
started subsidized programs after 1990 and no development was financed through Mitchell-Lama since the late 
1970, Mitchell-Lama properties are not included in the regression model.  
5 Miles






Number of Opted-opt units 
Proportion of opted-out units to total subsidized units (%)
0         2         7           20        35       60 <
CD with no subsidized units
Figure 4. Subsidized Properties that Opted out as of 2012 (by Community District)
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gentrification from other factors, the time period was set between 1990, when gentrification was 
widely observed and researched in New York City, and 2012, the year that the most up-to-date 
information is available for all subsidy property programs. The location of opted-opt or stayed 
properties included in the analysis was mapped in Figure 4. 
 
3.2.1. Regression Model 
This study employs a multivariate logistic regression model to assess the impact of gentrification 
indicators on the likelihood an owner opted out a subsidy program in New York City, while 





] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟 … + 𝛽7𝑂𝑜 +
𝛽8𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑣𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 
where, P𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡 is the probability of an owner opts out a subsidy program, G represents a set of 
gentrification indicators fully described in the following variable section; O is coded for non- or 
for-profit ownership; and P measures three different property characteristics.  
 
3.2.2. Variables  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is a binary variable representing whether or not the owner opted out as of 
2012. Properties that are classified as ‘Former’ in the SHIP dataset are the units whose owners 
opted out of the subsidized programs, and coded as ‘1’. Properties that stayed in any of the main 
four programs are coded as ‘0’.  
  





Table 3. Variables for the Regression Model 
 
Variable Type Explanation Source 
Opt-out     
  Opt-out  binary 
Properties that left or stayed in 
subsidized housing programs  
(0 = stay, 1=opt out) 
SHIP, HUD 
Gentrification Indicators (by Census Tract, 1990 - 2012) 
  ∆ Income ratio  continuous 
Change in ratio of census tract’s 
median household income to that 
of NYC  
ACS 2012 
1990 Census 
  ∆ Rent Ratio continuous 
Change in ratio of census tract’s 
median gross rent to that NYC  
ACS 2012 
1990 Census 
  %∆ Bachelor’s degree 
     
continuous 
Change in percentage of 
population with Bachelor’s 
degree or more  
ACS 2012,  
1990 Census 
  %∆ Owner-occupied    
      housing units 
continuous 
Change in percentage of owner-
occupied units 
ACS 2012,  
1990 Census 
  %∆ Vacant units continuous 
Change in percentage of vacant 
housing units 
ACS 2012,  
1990 Census 
  %∆ White population continuous 
Change in percentage of white 
population   
ACS 2012,  
1990 Census 
Ownership Type    
  Owner profile binary 0=for-profit, 1= non-profit 
SHIP, PLUTO, 
HUD 
Property Characteristics    
  Unit count continuous Total unit SHIP 
  Violation count continuous 
Number of reported serious 
building violations 
SHIP 
   Year built continuous Year properties were built  SHIP 
Source:  1. ACS 2012, American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates), US Census Bureau 
 2. 1990 Census, US Census Bureau          3. PLUTO, NYC Department of City Planning 
 4. HUD: Multifamily Assistance and Section 8 Contracts Database 










The independent variables of interest that are related to gentrification measure changes in 
demographic composition and socioeconomic status in the census tracts where subsidized 
housing units are located. Most of these measures were based on previous literature on 
gentrification. To be more specific, changes in percentage of white population, adults over 25 
with Bachelor’s degree or more, owner-occupied housing units, and vacant housing units 
between 1990 and 2012 were measured as each variable. In order to reflect the relative economic 
status of census tracts where subsidy properties are located, a ratio of median household income 
and median gross rent in the census tract to that of New York City3 in 1990 and 2012 were 
calculated, and changes in these ratios were included as variables.  
 
If a census tract has been gentrifying or gentrified over time, the percentage of white population, 
adults with Bachelor’s degree or more, owner-occupied housing units, income ratio and rent ratio 
are likely to increase while vacancy rate decreases. Thus, for the hypothesis to be proven, all or 
some of these gentrifying predictors except vacancy rate change variable would be positively 
related to opt-out, indicating higher probabilities of opt-out with higher values.   
 
Control Variables 
Several property conditions and owner’s characteristics that may affect opt-out decisions are 
included as control variables. The owner profile variable specifies two different types of subsidy 
property owners. Properties owned by non-profit owners are coded as ‘1’ and for-profit as ‘0’. I 
                                                            
3Adjusted to 2012 dollars, NYC’s median household income was $64,820 in 1990 and 63,982 in 2012. The median 
gross rent was $854 in 1990 and $1,084 in 2012.  
 
  




expected that for-profit owners are more likely to opt out than non-profit owners, as several 
previous findings suggested (HUD multi-disciplinary research team, 2015 and Reina & Begley, 
2014). 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Characteristics of Properties that Stayed or Opted out of the Subsidy 
Programs as of 2012  
 
Variable Stayed (N=1,308) Outed out (N=49) 
Gentrification Indicators    
  Income ratio (1990) 





  Rent ratio (1990) 





  Bachelor’s degree or more (1990) 





  Owner-occupied housing units (1990) 





  Vacant units (1990) 





  White population (1990) 





Ownership Type   
  Non-profit owner 20% 4% 
Property Characteristics    
  Unit count 48 79 
  Violation count 1.2 1.1 
  Year built 1938 1936 
 
The property variables-building violation count, year built, and total units-measure the physical 
conditions of subsidy properties that may influence the opt-out. For example, properties in worse 
physical condition may be more likely to extend their affordability restrictions in exchange for a 
subsidy to fund improvements (NYU Furman Center, 2015). In contrast, owners of properties 
  




with better physical conditions will be more likely to leave subsidy programs and convert their 
properties into higher market-rate rents to realize higher profits. Accordingly, this model may 
also show properties with low violation counts and that were built more recently are more likely 
to opt out. Detailed descriptions and sources for all variables used in the model are listed in 




Table 5 shows the results of the multivariate regression analysis. The first column contains 
estimated coefficients. Although it is rather difficult to interpret regression coefficients, they 
provide directional information about the link between explanatory variable and opt-out. For 
example, the white population variable has a positive coefficient, meaning that the higher the 
census tract’s white population percentage change, the higher the logit for the property’s opt-out 
in that census tract. The second column shows the relationship as odds ratio. The odds ratio for 
each independent variable implies how much the likelihood of opt-out would change for each 
one-unit change in that independent variable. An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates a positive 
relationship between the independent variable or control variable and the likelihood of opt-out 
while values less than 1 indicate a negative relationship. For example, for each increase of 
serious violation counts that has odds ratio of 1.0006, there is 0.1 percent increase in the odds of 
opt-out. The percent change in odds for unit increase in each explanatory variable is expressed in 










Table 5. Logistic Regression Model for Property Opt-out  
 
Variable Coefficient Odds ratio %1  
Gentrification Indicators    
  ∆ Income ratio -1.93209 0.1448 -85.5 * 
  ∆ Rent ratio -0.43424 0.6478 -35.2 *** 
 %∆ Bachelor’s degree 0.03667 1.0374 3.7 ** 
 %∆ Owner-occupied housing units -0.01635 0.9838 -1.6  
 %∆ Vacant units -0.04819 0.953 -4.7 ** 
 %∆ White population 0.00935 1.0094 0.9  
Ownership Type     
 Property owner profile -1.87739 0.153 -84.7 *** 
Property Characteristics     
 Unit count 0.00525 1.0053 0.5 ** 
 Violation count 0.00064 1.0006 0.1  
 Year built  -0.00794 0.9921 -0.8 * 
Pseudo R2 (McFadden's R2) 0.0955 - -  
N 1357 - -  
  * p < 0.10,  ** p <  0.05, *** p <  .01 
  1 % percent change in odds for unit increase in each explanatory variable  
    The regression model was adjusted to use robust standard errors. 
 
Overall, a link between gentrification indicators and opt-out decisions it suggests is substantive, 
but not consistent. Among six predictors, four are statistically significant, and two of them were 
related in the expected direction. The percentage change of population with Bachelor’s degree or 
more has the odds ratio of 1.0374, indicating that every 1% increase in this variable is associated 
with 3.7% increase in the odds of a property’s opting out in that census tract. In contrast, the 
percentage change of vacant units was negatively related to the likelihood of opt out, as 
  




expected. It has odds ratio of 0.953, meaning every 1 % increase in the percentage change of 
vacant units in a census tract between 1990 and 2012 is associated with about 4.7% decrease in 
the odds of a property’s opt-out.  
Opposite of the expected results, the income ratio change and rent ratio change revealed a 
negative relationship with the odds of opting-out. The income ratio has the odds ratio of 0.1448, 
indicating that a unit increase in a census tract’s income ratio is associated with 85.5% decrease 
in the odds of a property’s opting out in that census tract. Similarly, the rent ratio change variable 
also shows that a unit increase in this variable decreases the odds of opt-out by 35.2%.  
 
Some of control variables in the model perform according to expected predictions. Ownership 
type revealed strong impacts on the odds of opt-out with an odds ratio of 0.153. This indicates 
that a non-profit owner is 84.7% less likely to opt out than for-profit owner. Among property 
characteristics variables, the total unit variable suggested a modest statistically significant 
relation with the odds ratio of 1.0053. Another statistically significant predictor was year built, 
suggesting every 1 year increase in year built is associated with 0.8% decrease in the likelihood 
of opting out. This result is opposite to expected direction, which predicted the newer properties, 
the higher opt-out likelihood.  
 
 
Table 6. Predicted Probabilities of Opting-out by Statistically Significant Gentrification Indicators 
Predicted Probabilities Predicted Probabilities 
%∆ Bachelor’s degree %∆ Vacant units  
Low   0.0218241 Low  0.0568422 
 Medium 0.0320612 Medium  0.033993 
High 0.0720798 High  0.0229513 
  




∆ Rent ratio  ∆ Income ratio 
Low 0.0610908 Low  0.0611202 
Medium 0.0351384 Medium  0.0388062 
High 0.0208138 High  0.0192767 
 
To get a better sense of relationship between gentrifying indicators and opting-out, the predicted 
probabilities of opting-out when each statistically significant variable changes are presented in 
Table 6. I estimated the probabilities of opting-out when the value of each variable is low (at 
5%), medium (50%), and high (95%). To control for the other covariates, they are fixed at their 
means. For example, in a census tract where the percentage change in population with Bachelor’s 
degree or more is high, about 36.37 or at 95%, subsidized properties have a probability of 0.07 of 
opting out. The predictions suggest that the incremental increase in the probability of opting-out 
as a result of an increase in the percentage change of Bachelor’s degree. In contrast, the 
estimated probabilities went down as the percentage change in vacant units, the change in rent 
ratio, and the change in income ratio increased.  
 
As explanatory variables used in the regression were measured on different scale, it is hard to 
compare the odds ratio for one variable to that for another variable. In order to address this issue, 
I evaluated the effect of a 1-standard deviation change for continuous variables. In this model, 
only ownership profile variable is binary variable whose odds ratio and percentage can be 
directly interpreted, and the other variables for gentrification indicator and property 
characteristics are continuous variable. Table 7 presents the adjusted regression results to use 1-
standard-deviation change as the basis for interpreting odds ratio and percentage. The first 
column labeled as StdX contains the odds ratio for 1-standard deviation change in the predictor, 
and the percentage change in this odds ratio is expressed in the % StdX column. 
  




Table 7. Logistic Regression Model for Property Opt-out (by 1-standard-deviation change) 
Variable StdX1 % StdX2 SDofX3  
Gentrification Indicators    
 ∆ Income ratio  0.6535 -34.6 0.2201 * 
 ∆ Rent ratio  0.7028 -29.7 0.8123 *** 
 %∆ Bachelor’s degree 1.5179 51.8 11.3793 ** 
 %∆ Owner-occupied housing units 0.8832 -11.7 0.3983  
 %∆ Vacant units 0.76 -24 5.6952 ** 
 %∆ White population 1.1262 12.6 12.7055  
Ownership Type     
 Property owner profile 0.4527 -84.7 0.3983 *** 
Property Characteristics     
 Unit count 1.464 46.4 72.6228 ** 
 Violation count 1.0074 0.7 11.5157  
 Year built  0.7421 -25.8 37.5772 * 
Pseudo R2 (McFadden's R2) 0.0955 - -  
N 1357 - -  
 1 StdX = change in odds for standard deviation increase in explanatory variable X 
 2 %StdX = percent change in odds for standard deviation increase in X 
 3 SDofX = standard deviation of X 
 
After the adjustment, the Bachelor’s degree variable is found to be the most powerful predictor 
of all gentrification indicators, followed by income ratio change, rent ratio change, and vacant 
unit change.  
 
  





Figure 5. Percentage Change in Odds of Opt-out (by 1-standard-deviation change) 
 
Other statistically significant control variables whose substantive size of relationship were 
relatively small in the regression result also showed large effects on opting out when 1-standard-
deviation change was used as the basis of comparison. As the Table 7 shows, having a 1-
standard-deviation more unit increases a property’s odds of opt-out by 46.4%, and a property 
being a 1-standard-deviation newer reduces the odds of opting out by 25.8%. To compare the 
effects of each variable more easily, Figure 5 displays the percentage change in the odds ratio 
associated with each predictor in a bar graph form4. Except the ownership type that was binary 
and proven to be influential on opt-out in previous studies, the Bachelor’s degree percentage 
change showed the most substantial increase in the odds of opt-out among all other continuous 
variables. The effects of other gentrification factors, income ratio change, rent ratio change, and 
vacant unit change, are also comparable to those of other control variables. Taken together, 
neighborhood conditions associated with gentrification are found to have substantial impacts on 
                                                            
4 For ownership type variable, percentage change in odd for a 1-unit change is used as it is a dichotomous variable 
(non-profit versus for profit). 
  




property’s opt-out, although the effects are not always considerably greater than that of other 
factors such as ownership profile.  
 
Some limitations in this analysis leave a need for future study on this subject. First, as the dataset 
does not include the exact year of opting-out for each property, I assumed that the initial subsidy 
period ends within 22 years (1990-2012) for properties, and analyzed changes between this time 
period. Second, as the neighborhood conditions were analyzed by census tract level, census tracts 
where properties stayed and where properties opted out were overlapped in some cases, 
producing similarity among the data. Third, despite this model relied on previous literature to 
identify gentrification indicators, it is still difficult to measure the degree of gentrification and 
firmly define a neighborhood as gentrifying or gentrified. In addition, more extensive factors that 
might affect owner’s opting out can be included as control variables to distinguish the effects of 
gentrification predictors. Further studies that address such issues would yield more solid and 




4. Conclusion  
 
This thesis examined whether factors associated with gentrification would influence owner’s 
decision to leave housing subsidy programs through a logistic regression model. Overall, the 
analysis yielded mixed results. Most of gentrification predictors are found to have impacts on 
opt-out, but the directions of the relationships are not consistent. The Bachelor’s degree 
percentage change variable and the vacant unit change variable showed expected results. It was 
revealed that the higher the percentage change of Bachelor’s degree or more in a census tract, the 
  




higher odds of a property’s opt-out. In contrast, the percentage change of vacant units was 
negatively related to the odds of opting-out. Opposite of the expected results, both the income 
ratio change and the rent ratio change were negatively related to a property’s opting-out, 
indicating a greater increase in income and rent in a census tract decreases the odds of a 
property’s opt-out. It is hard to point out the reason why property owners in census tracts where 
income and rent price increase are less likely to opt out. One possible explanation would be that 
the rate of rent growth in the neighborhood is not high enough to encourage owners to leave 
subsidy programs in which they are already guaranteed certain amount of rents from existing 
tenants. Further research that focuses on such economic factors and their impacts on opting-out 
might provide some insights.  
As such, although not all of gentrification factors are related with opt-out in the expected 
direction, their statistical significance can suggest their influence on opting-out. At the same 
time, other factors that are known to affect property price and property’s opting-out of subsidy 
programs were also found to influence opt-out decisions in this model. In particular, as suggested 
in several previous literature, for-profit owners were highly likely opt out compared to non-profit 
owners.  
 
In sum, the findings indicated that properties located in neighborhoods with high Bachelor’s 
degree holder growth, and less vacancy rate change, income growth and rent growth are more 
likely to opt out. Also, those with for-profit owners and more units and those built earlier showed 
higher likelihoods of leaving subsidy programs. This result suggests that New York City and 
other municipalities that strive to preserve subsidized housing stocks can use neighborhood 
conditions and other detailed data to better target their efforts. For example, as properties are 
  




more likely to leave subsidy programs when the neighborhood shows some signs of 
gentrification, local governments should understand the impact of this change on the local 
property market and focus on incentives for property owners in these affected areas. At the same 
time, the findings of this study raise a need for discussion on the expiration, renewal and other 
overall terms of subsidy programs. As various factors including those discussed in this study do 
affect owners’ decision to leave subsidy programs, some subsidy programs that make 
affordability restriction permanent can be a consideration. Finally, through this type of analysis, 
municipalities can better monitor the existing subsidized housing stocks and properly predict an 
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